

24 September 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: George L. Cary

SUBJECT : Study on the Future of the Agency


1. It seems to me that the basic themes repeated frequently by the Director should shape the thinking of the future of the Agency. They are that the Agency will be an American institution; it will be a modern intelligence organization; and the best intelligence organization in the world. Our deeds, organization, and practices should conform to these themes.

2. By American, I mean we operate within the framework of our constitution, laws of the land, and the temper of the American society at the time. Accordingly, what we do and how we do it must meet the test of the foregoing. By modern, I mean more reliance on technology, more selective use of human sources, more open and accountable organization, and more sharing of our product, responsibilities, and confidences with the Congress and the public. By the best, I mean a responsive, effective, efficient and independent intelligence organization.

3. If we are to be American, modern and the best intelligence organization, we need not only to pursue the present changes, but go beyond them. The following are some of my ideas in this area:

a. The intelligence budget, an Agency figure, need not be secret. I believe the American people have the right to know how much money we are spending in this area. I think we can hold the line in terms of total disclosure. The enemy would not gain all that much from such a revelation. The GAO should be permitted to audit all but a few select areas of the Agency's activities. Here, I am talking about at least 90% of our activities which could be subjected to GAO audit.

b. DDO overseas presence should be reduced to meet real needs and not try to match State representation abroad.



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c. The Agency should get out of the propaganda and paramilitary business but strengthen the capabilities for political action through agents of influence. Retain the capability to perform as Executive Agent for limited paramilitary support.


d. Analysis and estimates must be independent of policy and political considerations and be more representative of the interaction between the collectors and the thinkers. We must create a facility which blends together the facts, interpretation of the facts, and the prediction based on both.

e. More of our product should be made available to the public. To the extent possible, our major works should be published with both a classified and a declassified version. We should get away from the silly notion that SIGINT and overhead reconnaissance is secret. Everyone knows that we are listening, recording and photographing around the world. Let us only protect essential methods. Let us take the secret out of the way we do our business. Let us stop using proprietaries, codewords, secret conduits in the U.S. when we don't have to. Let us use CIA cover as much as we can. In other words, let it be the rule rather than the exception. Let there be greater contact between the senior officials of the Agency and the American public. The Director doesn't have to do all the talking for us.

f. With the Congress, let us take a few chances. Give them more of our classified product and tell them about our activities when they want to know about them.

4. If we do some of the things suggested above, we can prove that a secret intelligence organization can function in a democracy. This presupposes that only very little needs to be secret. The problem has been that as we moved from 1947 to 1975 we made intelligence a big secret business when only a small part needed to be kept secret. We took all the cautions of the clandestine side and applied it to the entire business when it was not necessary to do so.

*Delete the Narcotics*




Associate Legislative Counsel

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